When Several Families Own the Same Club: What Sevilla FC Teaches Us About Governance

From the development of one of Europe’s most successful clubs to a confrontation between father and son, Sevilla’s story shows that shared ownership does not necessarily mean a shared project.

The struggle for power at Sevilla Fútbol Club could be presented as yet another conflict between the shareholders of a major sporting organisation. Yet Sevilla FC governance has become particularly complex because of one unusual circumstance: the club’s current president, José María del Nido Carrasco, has for years faced opposition from his own father, José María del Nido Benavente, a former president and the company’s largest individual shareholder.

The complexity of the case goes beyond a simple conflict between a controlling shareholder and the management. Nor can it be described merely as a disagreement between father and son. It is a dispute that simultaneously crosses the boundaries of family, ownership and management.

Sevilla, however, is not a conventional family business. There is no single controlling family that holds a majority of the shares and transfers leadership from one generation to the next.

The club is structured as a Spanish sports public limited company, or sociedad anónima deportiva, whose share capital has historically been fragmented among several shareholder families, including the Del Nido, Carrión, Alés, Castro and Guijarro families, alongside external investors who entered the ownership structure at a later stage.

This configuration turns Sevilla into a form of multi-family enterprise, in which control depends on the ability of different ownership groups to form coalitions.

A Club Built Through Successive Family Leaderships

The presence of families within Sevilla’s governing bodies is not a recent development.

Rafael Carrión served as president of the club between 1997 and 2000, during a period marked by financial and sporting difficulties. After leaving the presidency, he remained one of the principal shareholders, while his children began representing the family’s shares and occupying positions on the board of directors.

Carrión was succeeded by Roberto Alés, whose administration, between 2000 and 2002, is recognised by the club itself as the period in which the foundations were laid for Sevilla’s subsequent institutional and sporting recovery. His daughter, Carolina Alés, also joined the board and remained there for several years as the family’s representative.

In 2002, José María del Nido Benavente assumed the presidency, at a time when Sevilla entered a period of sporting and international expansion. His son, José María del Nido Carrasco, joined the club’s governing bodies in 2006, initially as deputy secretary of the board.

Following Del Nido’s departure, José Castro served as president of Sevilla between 2013 and 2023. Under his presidency, the club won five UEFA Europa League titles.

In December 2023, Del Nido Carrasco, the son of the former president, Del Nido Benavente, was chosen by the board to succeed him.

Viewed in isolation, this succession of presidents might suggest a relatively stable model, with families historically connected to the club being represented by different generations and sharing responsibilities within its governing bodies.

For a time, this arrangement worked.

The problem arose when continuity of ownership was no longer accompanied by continuity of consensus.

Power Does Not Necessarily Follow Ownership

Owning shares and controlling a company are not necessarily the same thing. Sevilla’s ownership structure demonstrates this distinction particularly clearly.

According to an analysis published in November 2025, the Del Nido family held approximately 28% of the share capital; the group formed by José Castro, the so-called Utrera Group and the Alés family held around 23%; the Carrión family owned approximately 15%; and the investor group known as “the Americans” controlled a further 15%.

None of these groups, acting alone, held a sufficient majority to control the company.

The governance of Sevilla therefore depended on agreements between shareholders, the composition of the board and the ability to secure sufficient votes at general meetings.

José María del Nido Benavente was the largest individual shareholder. His son, however, occupied the presidency with the support of a coalition formed by other family ownership groups and members of the board.

Del Nido Carrasco repeatedly stated that he would remain president because he had the support of the board and of the majority of the company’s share capital.

The case therefore reveals a particularly clear separation between three dimensions: economic ownership, political influence and managerial authority.

The largest shareholder did not control the board. The president did not depend on a personal majority shareholding. The different family groups had to negotiate continuously in order to maintain a functioning majority.

The Governance Agreement

In an attempt to organise this coexistence, some of the principal shareholders entered into a shareholders’ agreement in November 2019 intended to regulate the club’s governance.

According to information published about its terms, the agreement involved the principal shareholders, with the exception of the Carrión family, and was intended to remain in force until 2027, unless the parties agreed otherwise or a court ruled to the contrary.

Agreements of this nature may regulate the exercise of voting rights, the composition of governing bodies, the appointment of executives and the formation of majorities.

There is, however, a difference between an agreement capable of organising a relationship based on trust and one used to manage a relationship in which trust has already disappeared.

As the conflict intensified, the agreement ceased to function solely as an instrument of stability and became central to the dispute.

The board relied on the obligations established in the agreement to limit or neutralise votes held by Del Nido Benavente. The former president, in turn, began challenging both the continued validity of the agreement and its effects on the exercise of the political rights attached to his shares.

The court decisions addressed different aspects of the conflict and produced a complex legal landscape. In June 2025, the Provincial Court of Seville held that the agreement remained in force unless the parties reached an agreement or a final judgement established otherwise.

In September of the same year, however, a first-instance ruling ordered the club not to prevent Del Nido Benavente from voting at future general meetings. In June 2026, the parties requested the suspension of commercial court proceedings connected with the dispute.

As a result, the club’s governance became increasingly dependent on the judicial interpretation of instruments that had originally been intended to promote stability.

When Family Conflict Reaches the Boardroom

The most symbolic dimension of the case lies in the relationship between father and son. José María del Nido Benavente seeks to recover influence over the club and replace the board. José María del Nido Carrasco presides over the very body his father is attempting to remove.

This situation challenges the assumption that the presence of the next generation automatically represents continuity with the previous generation’s project.

In this case, biological succession occurred, but political succession did not.

The son joined the club’s governing bodies during his father’s presidency, built his own institutional career and subsequently became part of a coalition opposed to his father’s ambitions.

Sevilla provides an almost literal illustration of the three-circle model commonly applied to family businesses.

• As a son, Del Nido Carrasco belongs to the family: family,

• As a shareholder, he holds economic and political rights: ownership,

• As president and director, he must perform his duties with regard to the interests of the club: management,

These three positions do not necessarily lead to the same decision.

A son may believe that protecting the company requires him to oppose his father. A shareholder may wish to replace the management. A director may consider that following the instructions of the shareholder who appointed him would be incompatible with his duties towards the company.

Without appropriate family governance bodies, these disagreements cease to be managed within the family and migrate to general meetings, boardrooms, courts and the media.

From a Successful Coalition to an Economic Crisis

The coalition model involving several families accompanied the most successful period in Sevilla’s history. Yet sporting success also contributed to increasing the size, costs and complexity of the organisation.

When sporting results deteriorated and revenues from European competitions declined, the club’s financial weaknesses became more apparent.

The accounts for the 2024–2025 season recorded losses of approximately €54 million. Added to losses of around €19 million in 2022–2023 and €82 million in 2023–2024, the cumulative negative result over the three seasons approached €155 million.

The deterioration in the club’s financial position also altered the incentives of its owners.

While the club was growing, the coalition enabled the families to distribute influence, prestige and administrative positions. When the value of their shares became threatened by losses, indebtedness and sporting instability, selling became an increasingly attractive alternative.

The conflict was no longer limited to the question of who would govern Sevilla. It also came to involve when, how, for how much and to whom the families would sell their shareholdings.

The Attempted Sale to Sergio Ramos

At the beginning of 2026, Sergio Ramos, a former Sevilla player, led a proposal to acquire a majority interest in the club together with a group of investors.

The process advanced to a period of exclusive negotiations and financial due diligence. In May, reports suggested that an agreement had been reached between Ramos and the principal shareholders. The transaction, however, was not completed.

On 1 June, the Castro, Guijarro, Carrión and Alés families, together with Del Nido Benavente, issued a statement accusing the prospective purchasing group of substantially changing the profile of the investors and the conditions that had initially been discussed. Ramos disputed this account and stated that he remained willing to negotiate.

Following the failure of the transaction, the shareholders announced that discussions with other interested parties would resume.

Shortly afterwards, Fernando Carrión and Carolina Alés, representatives of two of the club’s most traditional shareholder families, resigned from their positions on the board.

At present, Sevilla formally remains under the presidency of Del Nido Carrasco, but with an administration that appears increasingly transitional and under pressure from the perceived need for a change of control.

What Sevilla FC Governance Teaches Family Businesses

The first lesson is that a coalition of shareholder families also requires family governance.

Each family needs to determine who represents its shares, how its members will form a common position, which criteria will be used to appoint directors and how internal disagreements between generations will be managed.

The second lesson is that a shareholders’ agreement cannot replace a shared project.

An agreement may establish voting obligations and mechanisms intended to ensure stability. On its own, however, it cannot generate trust, legitimacy or strategic alignment.

The third lesson is that ownership succession and political succession are different processes.

Heirs may receive shares without sharing the views of their predecessors. They may also assume positions on the board and form alliances with other ownership groups.

The fourth lesson is that a board of directors should not function merely as a gathering of family representatives.

When each director acts exclusively as the delegate of a particular ownership group, it becomes difficult to develop an institutional perspective capable of extending beyond the short-term interests of each group.

The fifth lesson is that the sale of the company also requires governance.

Who is authorised to negotiate? Must the shareholders sell jointly? What will the minimum price be? What guarantees should be required from the purchaser? How should essential assets, identity and legacy be preserved? What role will the families retain after the transaction?

Without answers agreed in advance, the sale ceases to be a strategic decision and becomes yet another arena for conflict.

Governance Is Not Merely About Deciding Who Occupies the Presidency

Sevilla did not enter into crisis because families were present among its shareholders.

For many years, it was precisely those families that supported the club’s recovery and participated in building the most successful period in its history.

The crisis arose because the governance structure did not evolve at the same pace as the club’s economic value, the complexity of the organisation, the arrival of new generations and the fragmentation of ownership interests.

The case demonstrates that tradition may confer legitimacy, shares may confer rights and agreements may organise votes. None of these elements, however, can guarantee continuity on its own.

When family, ownership and management cease to share a common direction, even an organisation with history, assets and international recognition may become dependent on court decisions and emergency negotiations to determine its own future.

At Sevilla, the problem was never the absence of owners. It was the absence of a common project capable of surviving them.